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The analysis of economic loss attributed to the shadow economy has attracted much attention 
in recent years by both academics and policy makers. Often, multiple indicators multiple 
causes (MIMIC) models are applied to time series data estimating the size and development 
of the shadow economy for a particular country. This type of model derives information about 
the relationship between cause and indicator variables and a latent variable, here the shadow 
economy, from covariance structures. As most macroeconomic variables do not satisfy 
stationarity, long run information is lost when employing first differences. Arguably, this 
shortcoming is rooted in the lack of an appropriate MIMIC model which considers 
cointegration among variables. This paper develops a MIMIC model which estimates the 
cointegration equilibrium relationship and the error correction short run dynamics, thereby 
retaining information for the long run. Using France as our example, we demonstrate that this 
approach allows researchers to obtain more accurate estimates about the size and development 
of the shadow economy. 
JEL Code: O17, O5, D78, H2, H11, H26. 
Keywords: shadow economy, tax burden, regulation, unemployment, cointegration, error 











Department of Economics 









    2 of 28 
                
 
This paper presents a first attempt to econometrically improve the multiple indicators multiple 
causes  (MIMIC)  model  in  order  to  gather  more  precise  information  about  the  size  and 
development of the shadow economy over time. Its main contribution is the first ever analysis 
of the cointegration of the shadow economy’s causes and indictors and the consideration of 
their long and short run relationships. 
 
The shadow economy is still a controversial issue. Every day, many people around the world 
are engaged in black market activities. These people usually go underground in order to avoid 
taxation and save money as products and services are considerably cheaper. Policymakers are 
concerned  about  rising  shadow  economic  activities  because  they  weaken  tax  and  social 
security bases. As a result, they may make ineffective policy decisions based on erroneous 
official indicators, which in turn give rise to crowding-out effects of official economic activity 
(Schneider and Enste, 2000). Economists focus on the shadow economy to improve economic 
theory. They also try to obtain accurate measures of the shadow economy for more effective 
formulation  of  economic  policies.  Specifically,  the  size  and  development  of  the  shadow 
economy is a fundamental requirement. Our paper presents an improved estimation procedure 
that provides more precise figures than previous attempts to quantify the shadow economy. 
 
Theoretical  and  empirical  research  in  the  field  of  shadow  economics  has  gained  much 
attention
1.  Although  some  progress  has  been  made,  it  is  still  a  difficult  task  because 
individuals  engaged  in  such  activities  do  not  wish  to  be  identified.  Consequently,  the 
estimation  of  the  shadow  economy  becomes  a  scientific  passion  to  know  the  unknown. 
Today, a variety of techniques has been employed to measure the size and development of the 
shadow economy. This includes direct approaches such as surveys and discrepancy methods 
as  well  as  indirect  methodologies  like  the  transaction  or  the  currency  demand  approach.
2 
Recently, the MIMIC model was derived as a special type of structural equation model with 
latent variables.
3 It analyzes the covariance structures between observable cause and indicator 
variables  to  derive  information  about  the  relationship  between  them  and  an  unobservable 
                                                 
1 See for example Schneider and Enste (2000 and 2002). 
2 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a reliable survey about diverse approaches. 
3 The MIMIC model approach traces back to Weck (1983), Frey and Weck (1983), and Frey 
and Weck-Hannemann (1984) and was enhanced by Aigner et al. (1988).  
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latent variable. Because it is generally agreed that the shadow economy can be treated as a 
latent variable, the MIMIC model rightly supplements existing direct and indirect approaches. 
In  contrast  to  the  latter,  its  major  advantage  is  that  it  differentiates  between  causes  and 
indicators  and,  most  notably,  when  estimating  the  shadow  economy  considers  its  various 
causes. 
 
Often, MIMIC models are applied to time series data to derive estimates of the size and 
development of the shadow economy over time. As most macroeconomic variables do not 
satisfy the underlying assumption of stationarity, the problem of spurious regressions may 
arise.  Researchers  usually  overcome  this  problem  by  transforming  the  time  series  into 
stationary ones, employing a difference operator. Alternatively, one could estimate an error 
correction  model  (ECM)  if  the  variables  were  cointegrated  and  a  stationary  long  run 
relationship existed between them. This approach has become popular in applied economics 
in recent years. The former approach, however, is still used in MIMIC model investigations of 
the  shadow  economy.  The  latter  MIMIC  model  in  first  differences  is  referred  to  as  the 
DYMIMIC model (Aigner et al., 1988). In the DYMIMIC model, on the other hand, the 
data’s long run information is lost if the variables are used in their first differences, albeit they 
are cointegrated. Retaining this information may help to improve estimates of the shadow 
economy. The authors are not aware of any study that tests for cointegration in the variables 
and makes use of their long run equilibrium relationships in a MIMIC model estimation. 
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  short  summary  of  the  basics  of 
cointegration and the error correction mechanism. The MIMIC model is presented in Section 
3. Section 4 widens the traditional MIMIC model, allowing for cointegration of the variables, 
and presents the covariance matrices for the new model’s long run and short run equations. In 
Section 5 we employ our model to France and present the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                             
 
Empirical investigations in macroeconomics using time series data mostly involve variables 
that do not fulfill the assumed statistical properties. Specifically, they are not stationary and 
integrated to an order  d different from zero  ) 0 d    ), d ( I ( > . In the past, such variables were 
differenced to remove random walk and/or trend components and then analyzed using the 
Box and Jenkins method. The drawback of this approach is that valuable information about  
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the variables’ potential long run relationship is lost. Granger and Weiss (1983) later showed 
that two variables,  t x  and  t y , each I(1), may have a linear combination,  t t t x y u β − = , that 
is, I(0). We would normally expect the standard linear regression model’s error term,  t u , to 
be I(1). But if  t u  is still a white noise series,  t x  and  t y  are said to be cointegrated with the 
cointegration  vector  ] , 1 [ β − .  Generally,  the  cointegrated  relation  between  variables  is 
interpreted as their long run equilibrium. This concept of cointegration immediately enjoyed 
great  popularity  because  it  finally  introduced  the  equilibrium  concept  of  economics  to 
econometrics. 
 
For any two cointegrated I(1) variables  t x  and  t y  with cointegration vector  ] , 1 [ β − , we know 
that their first differences  t x ∆  and  t y ∆  as well as their long-run relation  t t x y β −  are I(0). 
We can thus formulate the following equation: 
t 1 t t t w u x ∆ y ∆ + λ + γ = − ,                                                                                                        (1) 
where  t w  is a white noise error term and all expressions are I(0). The residual  1 t u −  is the 
one-period lagged equilibrium error of the cointegrated long run equation and is used as an 
error correction term in the dynamic, first difference regression of equation (1). Engle and 
Granger (1987) proved that this error correction model (ECM) is the data generating process 
of any two cointegrated variables  t x  and  t y  and that ECMs generate cointegrated variables.
4 
Unlike the examination of the long run equilibrium, the ECM studies the relationship between 
the deviations of  t x  and  t y  from their respective long run trends. The expansion of equation 
(1) to the multivariate case where       is a vector of variables that are individually I(1), and       
is a vector of variables containing a constant – variables that are assumed to be I(0) and where 
a time trend might also apply (Greene, 2007). 
 
The concepts of cointegration and error correction enable researchers to study both the long 
run relationship between variables and the deviations from their respective long run trends 
and gather a better understanding of the economy’s major features. Before showing how to 
utilize the idea of cointegration in  an  analysis  of structural equation relations, we briefly 
introduce the standard MIMIC model. 
 
                                                 
4 This class of models traces back to Sargan (1964), who introduced a model that retained 
long run information in a non-integrated specification for the first time.  
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The  MIMIC  model  explains  the  relationship  between  observable  variables  and  an 
unobservable variable by minimizing the distance between the sample covariance matrix and 
the  covariance  matrix  predicted  by  the  model.  The  observable  variables  are  divided  into 
causes of the latent variable and its indicators. Formally, the MIMIC model consists of two 
parts:  the  structural  equation  model  and  the  measurement  model.  The  structural  equation 
model is given by: 
,    t t ς + γ′ = η                                                                                                                             (2) 
where  ) x , , x , x ( qt t 2 t 1 t K = ′    is a  ) q 1 ( ×  vector of time series variables as indicated by the 
subscript  t . Each time series  q , , 1 i   ,   xit K =  is a potential cause of the latent variable  t η . 
) , , , ( q 2 1 γ γ γ = ′ K   ,  a  ) q 1 ( ×   vector  of  coefficients  in  the  structural  model  describing  the 
“causal” relationships between the latent variable and its causes. Since the structural equation 
model  only  partially  explains  the  latent  variable  t η ,  the  error  term  t ς   represents  the 
unexplained  component.  The  MIMIC  model  assumes  that  the  variables  are  measured  as 
deviations  from  their  means  and  that  the  error  term  does  not  correlate  to  the  causes,  i.e. 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( t t = ς = = η            and  0 ) ( ) ( t t t = ′ ς = ς′           . The variance of  t ς  is abbreviated by 
ψ and   is the  ) q q ( ×  covariance matrix of the causes  t x . 
 
The measurement model represents the link between the latent variable and its indicators, i.e. 
the latent unobservable variable is expressed in terms of observable variables. It is specified 
by: 
,    t t ε + λη =                                                                                                                             (3) 
where  ) y , , y , y ( pt t 2 t 1 t K = ′     is  a  ) p 1 ( ×   vector  of  individual  time  series  variables 
p , , 1 j   ,   yjt K = .  ) , , ( pt t 2 , t 1 ε ε ε = K       is  a  ) 1 p ( ×   vector  of  disturbances  where  every 
p , , 1 j   ,   jt K = ε  is a white noise error term. Their  ) p p ( ×  covariance matrix is given by      . 
The single  p , , 1 j   ,   j K = λ  in the  ) 1 p ( ×  vector of regression coefficients  λ, represents the 
magnitude of the expected change of the respective indicator for a unit change in the latent 
variable.  Like  the  MIMIC  model’s  causes,  the  indicators  are  directly  measurable  and 
expressed as deviations from their means, that is,  0 ) ( ) ( = =             . Moreover, it is assumed 
that the error terms in the measurement model do not correlate either to the causes       or to  
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the  latent  variable  t η ,  hence,  0 ) ( ) ( = ′ = ′                       and  0 ) ( ) ( t t = η′ = ′ η             .  A  final 
assumption is that the      s do not correlate to  t ζ , i.e.  0 ) ( ) ( t t = ′ ς = ς′             . Figure 3.1 shows 
the general structure of the MIMIC model. 
 
Fig. 3.1 General Structure of a MIMIC Model 
 
From  equation (2) and  (3) and making use of  the definitions, we can  derive the MIMIC 
model's  covariance  matrix     (see  Appendix  A).  This  matrix  describes  the  relationship 
between the observed variables in terms of their covariances. Decomposing the matrix derives 
the structure between the observed variables and the unobservable, latent variable, here, the 
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The first step in deriving the error correction MIMIC (EMIMIC) model is to put equation (2) 
into equation (3). This yields: 
                  + =                                                                                                                        (5) 
where        ′ =  and            + ζ = t . The error term       in equation (5) is a  ) 1 p ( ×  vector of 
linear combinations of the white noise error terms  t ς  and       from the structural equation and 
the  measurement  model,  i.e.  ) ( ~         .  The  covariance  matrix     is  given  as 
                + ψ ′ = ) ( . Equation (5) is comparable to a simultaneous regression model where 
the  endogenous  variables  p , , 1 j   ,   yjt K =   are  the  latent  variable  η’s  indicators  and  the 
exogenous variables  q , , 1 i   ,   xit K =  its causes. The application of cointegration theory to the 
MIMIC model is thus possible. 
 
From Section 2 we already know that the presumption that every element  p , , 1 , j   z j K =  of    
is a stationary white noise series is probably untrue if some of the causes and indicators 
q , , 1 i    ,   xit K =  and  p , , 1 j   ,   yjt K =  are  I(1) series. Thus, if       and       are vectors of  I(1) 
variables, one would normally expect every linear combination         ⋅ − jt y  to be I(1), i.e. a 
trend over time. Here,  ⋅      is the 
th j   ) q 1 ( ×  row vector of matrix   in equation (5); therefore, 
the 
th j   long  run  equilibrium  error  jt z   will  also  be  I(1),  which  implies  inconsistency  in 
equation  (5)  of  the  model.  On  the  other  hand,  we  know  that  if  a  linear  combination 
       ⋅ − = jt jt y z  exists, where  jt z  is I(0), the variables are said to be cointegrated (Engle and 
Granger,  1987).  The  vector  ]   , 1 [ ⋅ −     ,  where  ⋅       itself  is  a  ) q 1 ( ×   row  vector,  is  a 
cointegration  vector.  Generally,  since  every  linear  combination  p , , 1 j   ,   z jt K =   consists  of 
1 q+  variables, there could be more than one cointegration vector – in principle up to  q 
linearly  independent  cointegration  vectors  (Greene,  2007).  If  p  indicators  are  I(1),  the 
number of linearly independent cointegration vectors is  ) q p ( ⋅ . 
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Of course, not every macroeconomic variable is I(1): there may also be some I(0) time series. 
We therefore generalize the assumptions of the previous paragraph and denote these causes as 
a vector  ) v , , v , v ( rt t 2 t 1 K = ′     . Equation (5) then becomes: 
,                       + + =                                                                                                              (6) 
where        ′ =  and  ) , , , ( r 2 1 τ τ τ = ′ K    is the  ) r 1 ( ×  vector of coefficients of the I(0) variables 
in the structural relationship. Given that  r of the causes are I(0), the dimensions of        ′ =  
and       are  )] r q ( 1 [ − ×  and  ] 1 ) r q [( × − , respectively, and the dimensions of    and       are 
) r p ( ×   and  ) 1 r ( × ,  respectively.  Consequently,  if  r  of  the  causes  are  I(0),  the  maximum 
number  of  linearly  independent  cointegration  vectors  for  every  disturbance  term 
p , , 1 j   ,   z jt K =  in equation (6) is  ) r q ( − . Moreover, if  p s ≤  of the  p indicator variables are 
also individually I(0), the maximum number of linearly independent cointegration vectors 
decreases to  s ) r q ( − − . 
 
                                                         
 
As equation (1) shows, every cointegration relationship has an error correction mechanism 
where the long run relationship leads to equilibrium and the short run relationship contains a 
dynamic mechanism (Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus, equation (6) can be written as: 
.                              + + + = −                                                                                            (7) 
where                 − − = ,                 − − = ,                     − − − − = ,  and   ,   ,  and      are 
coefficient  matrices  in  this  dynamic,  short  run  model  specification.  Furthermore,  in  this 
specification        ′ =  is the  )] r q ( p [ − ×  coefficient matrix of the first differences of the I(1) 
causes, and        ′ =  is the  ) r p ( ×  coefficient matrix of the I(0) causes. The matrix        ′ =  
is the  ) p p ( ×  coefficient matrix for the long run disequilibrium's error correction term and 
) ( ~          is a white noise disturbance.
5 As long as       and       are vectors of I(1) variables, 
their changes will be I(0). Thus, every term in equation (7) – given that       and       in equation 
(6) are cointegrated, leading to       that is also individually I(0) – is I(0). Together, equation 
(6) and (7) define the EMIMIC model. Since the fundamental idea of the MIMIC model is to 
                                                 
5 Both separate equations of the MIMIC model in first differences are             + η = t ∆  and 
t t ∆ ς + ′ + ′ + ′ = η −                     .  Putting  the  first  equation  into  the  second  and  using  the 
definitions of                  + ς = t   and   ,   ,   ,  gives, at first,                                      + ′ + ′ + ′ = − , 
and, finally, equation (7).  
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minimize  the  distance  between  the  sample  covariance  matrix  and  the  covariance  matrix 
predicted by the model, the next step is to derive the underlying structural equation system, 
i.e. the covariance matrices of equations (6) and (7) for the EMIMIC model.  
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Next, we formulate this covariance matrix in terms of the observed variables as a function of 
the model parameters using the assumption established in Section 3 (see Appendix B). From 













′ ′ + ′
′ +
+ ′ ′ + ′ + ′
=
   
   
     
             
          
                      
 
2
,                                                            (8) 
where  ) ( :            ′ = .       is the covariance matrix for the I(1) causes and       for the I(0) 
causes. For all other variables, the definitions introduced in the previous sections still hold. 














− − − − ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
) ( ) , ( ) , (
) ( ) , (
) (
                     
         
     
 
                               
                       
                
      
  . 
Taking  ) ( ~           into  account,  defining  ) ( : t             ′ = ,  and  making  use  of  the 
assumptions established, we can also derive the short run equation’s covariance matrix in 
terms of the model’s parameters and covariances (see Appendix C). Thus, the covariance 
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.                                                   (9) 
A closer examination of equations (8) and (9) and a comparison with the MIMIC model's 
covariance matrix in equation (4) shows the effect of cointegration. In contrast to the latter, 
the EMIMIC model's covariance matrix in (9) is adjusted by the long run equilibrium error 
term’s covariance matrix    and the error correction term's parameter vector    . The further  
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modifications  are  needed  to  separate  the  I(0)  and  I(1)  causes  forming  sub-matrices 
( )           ′ ′ + , ( )           ′ + ,      ,      , and  . However, because    is still a function of 
the model parameters   ,  ,   , and    and of covariances, the estimation procedure ensures 
that an estimate for the EMIMIC model’s covariance matrix can be adapted. This model is 
now applied to estimate the size and development of the French shadow economy. 
 
                             
 
                              
 
Most analyses of the shadow economy come to the conclusion that tax and social security 
burdens  and  the  intensity  of  regulation  are  the  two  main  causes  affecting  the  size  and 
development of the shadow economy.
6 Taxes affect labor-leisure choices and stimulate labor 
supply in the shadow economy since the greater the difference between the total cost of labor 
in the official economy and the after-tax earnings from work, the greater the incentive to 
avoid this difference and to work in the shadow economy. An increase in the intensity of 
regulations, such as trade barriers and labor restrictions for foreigners, reduces the freedom 
(of choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy and leads to a substantial increase 
in  labor  costs  in  the  official  economy.  Since  most  of  these  costs  can  be  shifted  onto 
employees, there is further incentive to work in the shadow economy – where they can be 
avoided.  Statistically  significant  empirical  evidence  of  the  influence  of  taxation  and  the 
intensity of regulation on the shadow economy is provided in studies by Schneider (1994, 
2005) and Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b).  
 
Unemployment and the hours worked per employee in the official economy also affect the 
shadow economy. While it is clear that a reduction in working hours in the official economy 
increases hours spent working in the shadow economy, unemployment’s effect on the shadow 
economy is ambiguous. Whether the unemployment variable exhibits a positive or negative 
relationship depends on income and substitution effect. Income losses due to unemployment 
reduce demand in the shadow as well as the official economy. A substitution takes place as 
                                                 
6  See  Thomas  (1992),  Lippert  and  Walker  (1997),  Schneider  (1994,  1997,  2003,  2005), 
Johnson et al. (1998a,b), Tanzi (1999), Giles (1999), Mummert and Schneider (2001), Giles 
and Tedds (2002), Giles et al. (2002), and Dell’Anno and Schneider (2003).  
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unemployed workers turn to the shadow economy where cheaper goods make it easier to 
countervail utility losses. This may stimulate additional demand there. If the income effect 
exceeds the substitution effect, a negative relationship develops. Likewise, if the substitution 
effect exceeds the income effect, the relationship is positive.  
 
To mirror activities in the shadow economy, we use the monetary aggregate M1 and a GDP 
volume index. These variables are particularly suitable for this purpose as a result of the 
following considerations. Transactions in the shadow economy are typically carried out using 
cash or money that is drawn from a current account at a moment’s notice. We therefore expect 
a  positive  relationship  between  the  shadow  economy  and  M1.  The  lower  the  officially 
measured GDP, the fewer possibilities people have to earn money in the official economy, 
and the likelier they are to be driven into the shadow economy. In the short run, we expect 
this  negative  relationship  to  exist.  In  the  long  run,  however,  the  official  and  the  shadow 
economy  are  complements  rather  than  substitutes,  and  the  variables  will  thus  exhibit  a 
positive relationship. One possible explanation is that when the official economy grows, the 
shadow economy grows as well since favorable economic conditions do not discern between 
the official and unofficial economy. The demand for maintenance and other services in the 
shadow economy in particular increase in the long run as a result of higher consumption (e.g. 
cars) in the official economy. Based on these theoretical considerations, we employ tax and 
social  security  contribution  burdens,  the  intensity  of  regulation  (measured  by  the  ratio  of 
government employment to the total labor force), the unemployment rate, and an index of 
hours  worked  per  employee  as  causal  variables  for  the  shadow  economy  in  the  long  run 
equilibrium estimation. A GDP volume index and the monetary aggregate M1 are used as 
indicators. Figure 5.1 illustrates these relationships. The small squares attached to the arrows 
indicate the expected signs in the empirical analysis. 
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Fig. 5.1 Hypothesized Relationships in the MIMIC Model 
 
 
                                                             
 
Our data cover each quarter between 1981 and 2006: the number of observations is 104. Data 
sources  and  in-depth  definitions  of  the  variables  are  summarized  in  Table  D.1  in  the 
Appendix. We begin our empirical analysis by pre-testing the data. In the first step, each 
series is individually examined under the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative 
of stationarity. As shown in Table 5.1 we find that all variables are I(1) using conventional 
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Table 5.1: Analysis of Stationarity 
Variable  Test 
Equation 
Level  Test 
Equation 
First Difference 
Causes    ADF  PP  KPSS    ADF  PP  KPSS 
Tax  C & T  0.2707  0.4633  0.103
***  C  0.0000  0.0000  0.052
*** 
Unemp  C & T  0.5072  0.6582  0.196
*  C  0.0106  0.0006  0.304
*** 
Reg  C & T  0.2000  0.3190  0.276  C  0.0023  0.0012  0.539
* 
Work  C & T  0.4872  0.2755  0.145
**  C  0.0286  0.1712  0.138
*** 
Indicators    ADF  PP  KPSS    ADF  PP  KPSS 
GDP  C & T  0.1696  0.5827  0.118
*  C  0.0009  0.0000  0.109
*** 
M1  C & T  0.8536  0.0882  0.188  C  0.0208  0.0000  0.179
*** 
* Stationarity at 1%. 
** Stationarity at 5%. 
*** Stationarity at 10%. 
Note: For the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test, the 
MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p values are given whereas test statistics are reported for the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  (KPSS)  test.  Its  critical  values  are  taken  from 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). For a test equation with constant (C) the critical values are: 
0.347 (10% level), 0.463 (5% level), and 0.739 (1% level) whereas for a test equation with 
constant and trend (C & T) the critical values are: 0.119 (10% level), 0.146 (5% level), and 
0.216 (1% level). For the order of the autoregressive correction for the ADF test, we use the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). For the PP and KPSS tests, we use the Bartlett kernel 
estimator and the Newey-West (1994) data-based automatic bandwidth parameter method. 
 
 
Next,  we  use  the  Engle  and  Granger  two-step  approach  to  see  if  all  four  causes  are 
cointegrated  with  each  indicator  variable  and  therefore  exhibit  a  valid  error  correction 
representation  (Engle  and  Granger,  1987).  To  do  this,  we  first  estimate  least  square 
regressions with variables in levels, where the particular indicator is the dependent variable 
and the causes are the independent variables. Thus, the regression equations are: 
1 4 3 2 1 u Work g Re Unemp Taxes GDP + ⋅ α + ⋅ α + ⋅ α + ⋅ α =  and 
2 4 3 2 1 u Work g Re Unemp Taxes 1 M + ⋅ α + ⋅ α + ⋅ α + ⋅ α =  . 
Because  all  variables  are  deviations  from  their  means,  no  constant  is  included  in  the 
regression equations. Next we analyze the assumed cointegration relationship’s residuals  1 u  
and  2 u  using the ADF test. If the causes are cointegrated with the indicators, we expect the 
ADF test to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative for both error terms 
1 u  and  2 u . As presented in Table 5.2, we can in fact reject the null hypothesis for both 
residuals  at  conventional  significance  levels.  We  therefore  conclude  that  the  causes  are 
cointegrated with each indicator. 
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Table 5.2: Analysis of Cointegration Between Causes and Indicators 












-4.0569  0.55 








-3.8725  0.62 
Note: The critical values of the ADF test’s t-statistic are taken from Engle and Yoo 
(1987). For a sample with 100 observations, they are: 4.61 (1% level), 4.02 (5% level), 
and 3.71 (10% level). The order of the autoregressive correction has been chosen using 
the AIC as suggested by Engle and Yoo (1987). Thus, the null hypothesis of a unit root 
is rejected at the 10% level for residual  1 u  and at the 5% level for residual  2 u . The p-
values of the parameter estimators are given in parenthesis. 
 
 
The confirmation of both cointegration relationships permits the estimation of a long run 
equilibrium MIMIC model for the size and development of the shadow economy according to 
equation  (5).  The  next  step  is  to  estimate  the  short  run  MIMIC  model  of  equation (7) 
employing first differences of all causes and indicators. The estimation also includes the long 
run error correction terms  1 u  and  2 u  from both cointegration relationships. Here, the number 
of  observations  is  103.  Table  5.3  presents  the  long  run  equilibrium  model’s  parameter 
estimates and primary test statistics as well as those for the short run model. Supplementary 
summary statistics indicating the overall fit of both MIMIC models are provided in Table D.2 
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  Table 5.3: MIMIC Models and Parameter Estimates 




























1 u   --  -0.04 
(-0.47) 
2 u   --  -0.27
*** 
(-3.50) 
Indicators     







Statistics     
Chi-square  2.54  17.17 
Degrees of Freedom  13  26 
P-value  0.9989  0.9073 
Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) 
0.000  0.000 
T-statistics  are  reported  in  parenthesis. 
*  Significance  at  10% 
level. 
** Significance at 5 % level. 
*** Significance at 1% level. 
 
 
The estimated coefficients of all variables in the long run equilibrium relationship are highly 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level and have the theoretically expected sign. 
In the short run, the MIMIC model estimates for the independent variable “Work” and the 
residual  1 u   from  the  cointegration  relationship  between  the  causes  and  the  GDP  are  not 
statistically significantly different from zero. As in the long run equilibrium relationship, all 
remaining variables – with the exception of M1, which is statistically significant only at the 
10% level – are statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the various test statistics 
point to a close fit.  
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In order to estimate not only the relative size of the parameters but also their levels, it is 
necessary to fix a scale for the unobservable latent variable. A convenient way to determine 
the relative magnitude of the variables is to set the coefficient of one of the measurement 
model’s indicator variables to non-zero.
7 Here, we fix the coefficient of the variable GDP for 
both the long run and the short run MIMIC estimation. 
 
We now summarize our findings from the estimations. First, we can confirm our theoretical 
considerations.  Second,  tax  and  social  security  contribution  burdens  and  the  intensity  of 
regulation are important causes of the size of the shadow economy. These findings confirm 
our hypothesis as well as previous empirical findings. As expected, the relation between hours 
worked per employee and the shadow economy is negative, i.e. decreasing working hours 
encourage people to engage in informal economic activities. With regard to unemployment, it 
turns out that the overall long run effect is negative. That is, the income effect exceeds the 
substitution effect. This finding is supported by  the positive relation between the shadow 
economy and official GDP, suggesting that in the long run the two are complements rather 
than substitutes. As expected, however, the short run relationship is negative, i.e. people who 
face unemployment switch to the shadow economy thereby negatively affecting official GDP. 
The other causes also show the expected sign in the short run estimation. That is, high tax and 
social security contribution burdens and a high intensity of regulation force people into the 
shadow economy. Declining working hours create the required freedom for those activities. 
 
Both  the  long  run  equilibrium  relationship  and  the  short  run  dynamic  error  correction 
representation  of  the  MIMIC  model  represent  our  EMIMIC  model.  With  it,  we  can  now 
estimate the size and development of France’s shadow economy. The first step uses the long 
run part of our model to calculate the ordinal index. This index is then transformed into a 
cardinal series using the average of the estimates from Dell’ Anno et al. (2007) and Schneider 
(2005),  which  is  14.25%  of  official  GDP  in  1995.  Next,  the  short  run  deviations  from 
equilibrium are calculated. Finally, taking these into account, estimates for the French shadow 
economy are derived using Bajada and Schneider’s (2005) calibration methodology. Figure 
5.2  illustrates  these  results.  The  thick  line  is  the  long  run  equilibrium,  and  the  thin  line 
represents  the  final  estimates  for  the  French  shadow  economy  taking  short  run  dynamic 
fluctuations into account. 
                                                 
7 Giles and Tedds (2002), 109.  
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Long run Equilibrium Deviation from Equilibrium
 
Fig. 5.2 Size of the French Shadow Economy in % of Official GDP 
 
Applying the EMIMIC model to the French shadow economy produces an estimate of 12.88% 
in Q1 1982, which increases to 15.93% in Q4 2006. All quarterly estimates for 1982 to 2006 
are shown in Table D.3 in the Appendix. Table D.4 compares these estimates with those of 
the  long  run  equilibrium  relationship  and  illustrates  this  deviation  for  France’s  shadow 
economy.  Thus,  our  findings  correspond  to  other  recent  studies  of  the  French  shadow 
economy  with  13.80%  for  1990-93  (Schneider  and  Enste,  2000)  and  15.30%  for  2000 
(Schneider, 2005). Our approach is nonetheless quite different from previous investigations 
because we use the long run equilibrium estimation for the initial calculation of the cardinal 
time series index. The calibration methodology is then only used to correct for deviations 
from equilibrium in the short run. Previous studies, on the other hand, derive the cardinal 
index of the shadow economy in a particular country from their DYMIMIC estimates using 
some  type  of  calibration  methodology.  Our  EMIMIC  model  thus  estimates  the  size  and 
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In this paper we consider cointegration and error correction techniques within a latent variable 
approach.  First,  we  demonstrate  the  possibility  of  controlling  for  long  run  equilibrium 
relationships in a MIMIC model by using the standard econometrics of cointegration and 
error  correction  mechanisms.  Next,  we  present  the  cointegration  equation  and  the  error 
correction equation of a MIMIC model where indicators and causes are cointegrated. Finally, 
we derive the covariance matrices for the EMIMIC model and employ this model to estimate 
the size and development of the French shadow economy. We demonstrate that the EMIMIC 
model better quantifies the size of the shadow economy because it considers both the long run 
equilibrium relationships and the short run dynamic error corrections at the same time. This is 
particularly advantageous for economists trying to gather more precise figures for and track 
the development of the shadow economy and, of course, for the improvement of research in 
this  problematical  field  of  statistics.  The  preciseness  of  our  estimates  also  benefit 
policymakers’ efforts to deal with the shadow economy and their formulation of economic 
policy strategies. 
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The  MIMIC  model’s  structural  and  measurement  equations  are  t t ς + ′ = η         and 
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After taking the transposes, multiplications, and making use of the assumptions that: 
1.  the  variables  are  measured  as  deviations  from  mean,  i.e. 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t t = = = ς = = η                       ; 
2.  the  error  terms  do  not  correlate  to  the  causes,  i.e.  0 ) ( ) ( t t = ′ ς = ς′               and 
0 ) ( E ) ( = ′ = ′                   ; 
3.  the error terms do not correlate across equations,  0 ) ( ) ( t t = ′ ς = ς′             ; and, 
4.  the  errors  of  the  measurement  model  do  not  correlate  to  the  latent  variable,  i.e. 
0 ) ( ) ( t t = η′ = ′ η             ; 
we distribute the expectation operator and can thus derive both the variance and covariance 
between the observable variables. By doing this, it follows that: 
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( )             = ′ . 
Thus,       is the covariance matrix of the error terms in the measurement model;  ψ is the 
variance of the error term in the structural equation; and,    is the covariance matrix of the 
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The EMIMIC model's long run equations with I(0) and I(1) causes are            + η = t  and 
t t ς + ′ + ′ = η             . As a result, the covariance matrix in its general form is given as: 
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After  multiplication,  distributing  the  expectations  operator,  and  using  the  necessary 
assumptions, we get the covariance matrix in terms of model parameters and covariances. Its 
sub-matrices are: 
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where       and       are sub-covariance matrices of the I(0) and I(1) causes, respectively. We 
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Both  of  the  short  run  part  of  the  EMIMIC  model’s  equations  are             + η = t ∆   and 
t t ∆ ς + + + = η −                  . As a result, the model's general covariance matrix is given as: 
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In terms of model parameters and covariances, it becomes:  
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In  addition  to  previous  definitions,  we  define  ( )               ′ = , : ,  ( )                  ′ = : ,  and 
assume that the long run part's error term is a stationary white noise series. Consequently, its 
covariance matrix should not change with time, i.e.  ( ) ( )                     = = − . We further 
assume  that  0 ) ( 1 t = ς′−       ,  0 ) ( 1 t = ′ ς −       ,  0 ) ( = ′−           ,  and  0 ) ( t = ′ −           .  In  addition, 
0 ) ( t = ′ η −         and  0 ) ( t = η′ −        . As a result, the sub-matrices are derived as follows: 
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Table D.1: Data Sources 
                                           
Causes       






Quarterly Data (Q1 1981:Q4 
2006), seasonally adjusted 
Unemp  Unemployment Rate  OECD Economic 
Outlook 
Quarterly Data (Q1 1981:Q4 
2006), seasonally adjusted 
Reg  Government 




Quarterly Data (Q1 1981:Q4 
2006), seasonally adjusted 
Work  Hours Worked per 




Index Series (2000=100), 
Quarterly Data (Q1 1981:Q4 
2006), seasonally adjusted 
Indicators       
M1  Monetary Aggregate 
M1 
Banque de France  Natural Logarithm, Quarterly Data 
(Q1 1981:Q4 2006) 
GDP  GDP  OECD Economic 
Outlook 
Volume Index (2000=100), 
Quarterly Data (Q1 1981:Q4 
2006), seasonally adjusted 
 
 
Table D.2: Further Summary Statistics of the MIMIC Models 




P-value for Test of Close 
Fit 
(RMSEA < 0.05)  1.0000  0.9800 
Root Mean Square 
Residual (RMR)  0.0035  0.0540 
Standardized RMR  0.0035  0.0550 
Goodness of Fit Index 
(GFI)  0.99  0.96 
Adjusted Goodness of 
Fit Index (AGFI)  0.99  0.94 
Parsimony Goodness of 
Fit Index (PGFI)  0.61  0.69 
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Table D.3: Size of the French Shadow Economy in % of Official GDP 
Year  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
1982  12.88  12.86  13.11  13.06 
1983  12.96  13.00  13.08  13.20 
1984  13.30  13.47  13.32  13.47 
1985  13.28  13.28  13.27  13.27 
1986  13.39  13.29  13.39  13.58 
1987  13.68  13.52  13.60  13.41 
1988  13.29  13.40  13.32  13.51 
1989  13.57  13.83  13.82  13.62 
1990  13.81  13.98  13.99  14.14 
1991  13.89  13.99  13.99  13.97 
1992  13.71  13.98  14.01  14.13 
1993  13.99  14.06  14.04  14.07 
1994  14.03  13.96  14.02  14.12 
1995  14.30  14.23  14.58  14.66 
1996  14.58  14.49  14.54  14.52 
1997  14.34  14.30  14.28  14.31 
1998  14.33  14.35  14.56  14.68 
1999  14.66  14.64  14.69  14.84 
2000  14.83  15.09  15.27  15.25 
2001  15.31  15.48  15.45  15.69 
2002  15.52  15.68  15.77  15.89 
2003  15.73  15.82  15.61  15.57 
2004  15.52  15.35  15.42  15.34 
2005  15.43  15.62  15.56  15.76 
2006  15.72  15.72  15.93  15.93 
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Table D.4: EMIMIC vs. Long Run Equilibrium (% of Official GDP) 







1982  13.06  12.99  0.06 
1983  13.20  13.03  0.18 
1984  13.47  13.34  0.13 
1985  13.27  13.36  -0.10 
1986  13.58  13.49  0.09 
1987  13.41  13.56  -0.15 
1988  13.51  13.57  -0.06 
1989  13.62  13.83  -0.21 
1990  14.14  14.03  0.11 
1991  13.97  13.93  0.04 
1992  14.13  13.96  0.17 
1993  14.07  13.96  0.12 
1994  14.12  14.19  -0.07 
1995  14.66  14.48  0.18 
1996  14.52  14.47  0.05 
1997  14.31  14.43  -0.12 
1998  14.68  14.62  0.06 
1999  14.84  14.97  -0.13 
2000  15.25  15.35  -0.10 
2001  15.69  15.55  0.15 
2002  15.89  15.76  0.14 
2003  15.57  15.53  0.04 
2004  15.34  15.43  -0.09 
2005  15.76  15.78  -0.03 
2006  15.93  16.01  -0.09 
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